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I. The Korean Health Care System 
1. A Short History of Korean Health Policy 
    Health policy and its priorities in Korea have varied since the 1950s, reflecting the rapidly 
changing economic and social conditions of the society. Following the creation of the Korean 
government in 1948, health policy focused on controlling communicable diseases, promoting 
primary health care services in certain undeserved areas, and family planning. Government 
priorities shifted to establishing secure and equitable access to a minimum set of curative 
services towards the end of the 1970s. The establishment of National Health Insurance (NHI) 
represented a landmark change in the Korean health care system and the main focus remained 
on demand side interventions until universal insurance coverage was completed in 1989. NHI 
and rapid economic growth boosted a remarkable increase in the demand for health care 
services, which spurred the private sector to establish new medical facilities and private medical 
schools to expand. Public policy towards the supply side has been inspired by a laissez faire 
approach. Two recent reforms in July 2000, the one integrating multiple health insurers into a 
single payer (Integration Reform) and the one separating the roles of prescribing and dispensing 
drugs between doctors and pharmacists (Separation Reform) have brought significant changes 
to the system.  
 
2. Players in Korean Health Policy Making 
    Private providers dominate the Korean health care system and supply the majority of health 
care services, with public providers playing a residual role. The government has a limited role 
as a provider of curative services and has responsibilities for public health services but still 
plays a modest role in disease prevention and health promotion. Basically the government has a 
laissez faire policy towards regulating private suppliers. NHI is financed through contributions 
by employers, employees, the self-employed, and government. Providers are mainly paid fee-
for-service, and payments for insured services are directly settled between the insurer, the 
National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC), and providers. 
 3    The NHIC purchases insured health care services for the entire population and contracts 
with mostly private providers for the delivery of these health care services. However, the NHIC 
plays a limited role as an insurer in general. The insureds are required to pay high co-payments 
on insured services. In addition, a fairly large private market exists for uninsured services which 
are supplied in a competitive setting with market-based prices. Sometimes the nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) play an important role. They have an experience of producing a 
compromised scheme of the separation of prescribing and dispensing. Figure 1 illustrates the 
Korean health care system. 
 





























































 43. International Comparison of Korean Health Service
1 
Although life expectancy, which was 78.1 years for females and 70.6 years for males in 1997, 
is still among the lowest in OECD countries, it has been rapidly catching up with the OECD 
average because of fast economic development and rapid industrialization since the 1960s. The 
number of potential years of life lost (PYLL under age 70 per 100,000) is worse than OECD 
average for males, but much better for females. Infant mortality rates have been steadily 
reduced. In 1990, while infant mortality was still high by OECD standards, the gap between 
Korea and other Member countries had been much reduced (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Trends in infant mortality rate, 1960-1999 
 1960  1970  1980  1990  1999 
Iceland 13  13.2  7.7  5.9  2.4 
Sweden 16.6  11  6.9  6  3.4 
Japan 30.7  13.1  7.5  4.6  3.4 
France 27.5  18.2  10  7.3  4.3 
Germany 33.8  23.6  12.6  7  4.6 
Canada 27.3  18.8  10.4  6.8  5.5
1) 
Australia 20.2  17.9  10.7  8.2  5.7 
New Zealand  22.6  16.7  13  8.4  6.8
1) 
United States  26  20  12.6  9.2  7.3
2) 
Korea   45  17  12  7.7
3) 
Slovakia 28.6  25.7  20.9  12  8.3 
Hungary 47.6  35.9  23.2  14.8  8.5 
Poland 54.8  36.7  25.5  19.3  8.9 
Mexico 74  68  40  24  14.5 
Turkey 189.5  145  117.5  57.6  37.5 
OECD Average  37.6  28.3  17.5  10.8  6.7 
Note: 1) Data refer to 1997. 
     2) Data refer to 1998. 
     3) Data refer to 1996. 
Sources: OECD Health Data 2001. Reprinted from OECD(2002). 
 
    Mortality and morbidity patterns have changed from communicable diseases to chronic and 
lifestyle-related diseases. The three main causes of deaths in Korean are cardiovascular diseases, 
cancer, and accident and injuries (Table 2). Deaths linked to cardiovascular diseases have been 
decreasing over the years but still are the major cause of death. Cancer has on the contrary 
augmented in importance. 20% of all deaths from malignant neoplasm are from lung cancer, up 
from 10% in 1985. Deaths from car accidents are rather high by OECD standard. In 1997, they 
represented 4.4% of overall deaths, contrary to an OECD average of 1.9%. Finally, deaths 
                                                           
1  All statistics were cited from OECD(2002). 
 5linked to the digestive system, particularly diseases of the liver and cirrhosis were in 1997 the 
second highest in OECD countries after Hungary.  
 
Table 2. Leading causes of mortality in Korea, selected years 







njury & accidents Digestive system
1985 33.64%  27.10%  12.79%  6.60%  7.57% 
1990 32.97%  20.37%  17.48%  9.75%  6.77% 
1995 28.71%  18.98%  19.42%  9.66%  6.43% 
1997 24.98%  21.91%  20.15%  9.44%  5.63% 
Sources: OECD Health Data 2001. Reprinted from OECD(2002). 
 
  These data suggest that much improvement in health status could be achieved by investing in 
preventive interventions. Daily smokers account for about a third of the population, one of the 
highest proportions in OECD countries, which can in part explain the high rates of lung cancer. 
Alcohol consumption is below the OECD average, but about half of the male drinkers consume 
alcohol at a harmful level, which could explain, in part, the high level of digestive diseases by 
OECD standards.  
 
4. Major Characteristics of Korean Health Care System 
    Korea has reached universal if partial public health insurance coverage over a very short 
period, and at low cost. Three factors explain the low cost of achieving universal coverage: 
limited benefit coverage (due to high co-payments and service exclusions), low fees imposed on 
providers for insured services, and growth of fees kept within the general price increase.  
    Patients enjoy freedom of choice of provider within the system and also receive medical 
treatment without long delays. In addition, they can choose between traditional (oriental) and 
western medicine. Oriental medicine has long contributed to the improved health of Koreans 
with excellent clinical treatment effects. However, the lack of appropriate systems and 
organization for the development of oriental medicine in Korea has been a barrier for the 
standardization and modernization of oriental medicine. The Oriental Medicine Bureau was 
established at the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) in 1996 to fulfill the public demand 
for the national and international development of oriental medicine. 
    Limited government investment in health delivery, rather than poor quality of public sector 
provision, seem to account for the pervasive use of private health facilities. About 90% of 
physicians and hospital beds are private. Total number of licensed physicians and inpatient care 
beds as of 2000 are 72,500 and 287,400, respectively. Total number of hospitals including 
oriental and dental hospitals and clinics including dental and oriental clinics are 1,100 and 
37,200, respectively. 
 6    The health care system leaves many citizens relatively unprotected in times of financial 
distress. Financial barriers to access become insurmountable for the people at the bottom end of 
the income distribution. High co-payments, high fees for uninsured services and the widespread 
practice of informal treatment charges severely constrain individuals’ access to care. The 
Medical Aid Program (MAP), which provides a safety net for the most destitute, covers only 
3.5% of the population. 
        Fee-for service reimbursement, the lack of effective gatekeeping, and unconstrained 
freedom of choice of provider have significant positive effects on health expenditure per capita 
in ambulatory care and create incentives to overprovide. Tight regulation of medical fees within 
the NHI system created additional incentives for doctor to increase volumes, reduce 
consultation times, substitute drugs for their labour, and substitute uninsured services for 
insured ones. The privately dominated hospital sector has a propensity to adopt and utilize 
medical technology vigorously. Cost containment has relied heavily on controls of fees, leaving 
volume to find its own level. 
    Medical institutions in Korea are not clearly differentiated. Hospitals are operating extended 
outpatient departments and many clinics are providing inpatient treatments, particularly in 
surgery and obstetrics. Hospitals compete with clinics for ambulatory patients rather than 
coordinate with them. This might lead to a duplication of facilities and activities. 
    An effort to control the quality of clinical care is needed. There are no institutionalized 
mechanisms to stimulate the reduction of variations in medical practice, such as best practices 
or standards of treatments. Assessment of new medical technology is also weak. The mix of 
services is strongly geared towards curative services while there is very limited investment in 
health promotion.  
  The efficacy of the government approach to health policy, traditionally laissez-faire towards 
the supply side and authoritarian on fee setting, has been faltering. The reactions to the July 
2000 reforms were strong and unexpected. Doctors’ strikes, fee rises and the subsequent 
financial crisis brought much adverse publicity. There are now public demands for better value 
for money, greater transparency, and a new accountability framework for national health 
insurance and medical practice.  
  While the Korean society is among the youngest within OECD member countries, its 
population is aging fast following drops in fertility and in mortality rates at older ages. The 
proportion of the population above age 65 moved from 4.3% to about 7% in 2000, and is 
projected to reach 14% in 2022. It will take Korea 22 years to double the 2000 share of elderly 
population, what took 41 years in UK and 115 years in France (Table 3). 
 
 7Table 3. International Comparison of Aging Societies 
 Elderly  share  of 
7% 
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Source: UN, the Sex and Age distribution of World Population, as cited in Lee, H. (2001). 
 
 
II. National Health Insurance in Korea 
1. History and Development of NHI 
    Until the mid-1970's, patient's medical care was his/her own responsibility, except for those 
insured under pilot health insurance programs and for indigents, who were cared for by the 
government and/or private charity hospitals. In 1976, the Korean government introduced a 
health insurance law to provide its citizens with compulsory medical care. There was a 
considerable discussion concerning who should be covered first. It was proposed that those in 
great need, such as poor farmers and the self-employed, be considered first. However, since it 
was very difficult to collect premiums, it would have been necessary to provide a large amount 
of government subsidy, and in addition, there was concern about lack of health resources in 
rural areas. As a result, the government made a decision to begin with large workplaces with 
500 employees or more in July 1977. At the same time, the government-sponsored Medicaid 
program was introduced for those under the poverty line. Since 1977 coverage has been 
gradually expanded to small workplaces.  
    There was also a growing need to cover regional residents. After  implementation of 
demonstration projects and considerable discussion, the government expanded coverage to rural 
residents in 1988 and urban residents in July 1989, where a substantial portion of total 
expenditures are subsidized by the government. Thus, Korea was able to achieve universal 
health insurance in twelve years.  
    Up to September 1998, NHI had been administered by 373 independent funds, of which 227 
were regional funds based on the geographical area of local governments, and 145 were 
corporational funds. Furthermore there were two more funds. One is civil servants’ fund and the 
other is private school teachers' fund.  
    The new (Kim Dae Jung) government has driven to consolidate the whole administrative 
system to increase in equity in health financing and to improve efficiency of the NHI system 
 8since February 1998. The integration was enforced with two step strategy, and enforced with an 
accelerated power because the financing of regional funds, especially the rural and small cities’ 
funds were not sustainable under the economic crisis. In the first step, 227 regional funds were 
integrated in October 1998. And in July 2000, the whole funds have been integrated including 
145 corporational funds. But still financial integration has not been implemented. Two types of 
financial pools exist, that is, regional pool and worker-and-salaried workers pool. The financial 
consolidation, one of the hot issues, is supposed to be accomplished beginning July 2003 by the 
law. 
 
Table 4. Major Development of Health Insurance in Korea 







Compulsory health insurance implemented for large  
Workplaces with 500 employees or more 
Medicaid provided for low income earners under Public  
Assistance 
14.5   1,012 
1979 
Government employees, private school teachers and  
Employees are compulsorily insured 
Expanded coverage to employees with more than 300 
employees 
26.9   1,644 
1981  Expanded to workplaces with at least 100 employees  29.6   1,734 
1983  Expanded to workplaces with 16 Employees or more  39.3   2,002 
1987  Insurance coverage includes oriental medicine  -   3,110 
1988  Rural residents compulsorily insured 
Expanded to workplaces with five employees or more  79.1   4,127 
1989  Urban residents compulsorily insured 
Coverage includes drugs dispensed at pharmacy  99.9   4,994 
1995  Extended coverage from 180 days to 210 days.  -  10,076 
1996 
Extended insurance from 210 to 240 days 
Elderly and disabled are covered without limit 





1997  Extended insurance from 240 to 270 days  -  - 
1998 
Extended insurance from 270 to 300 days 
Integrate civil servants/private school teachers insurance and 
regional residents insurance(Oct. 1998) 
-   6,823 
1999  Extend insurance coverage from 270 to 330 days   -   8,581 
2000  Extend insurance coverage from 270 to 365 days  
Integrate a whole administration (July 2000)  
Prescription-and-dispense system adopted (July 2000)  
- 10,000p 
2001 
RBRVS fee schedule adopted  
- - 
Note:  1) Includes population under Medicaid. 
Sources: MOHW and Bank of Korea 
 92. Financial Aspects (Sources and Uses) of NHI 
    The entire Korean population is covered for the risk of medical illness, either through the 
NHI, a social health insurance scheme financed by mandatory contributions, or throughout the 
Medical Aid Program (MAP), a social assistance scheme for the very poor financed through 
general taxation. Benefit coverage is standardized and there are no differences in benefits 
between NHI and MAP patients. All patients except some MAP beneficiaries have to make 
substantial payments towards their treatments. 
    People pay for health services and health insurance coverage in four main ways - NHI 
contributions, out-of-pocket payments, tax, and private health insurance premiums (Figure 2).  
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Source: National Health Insurance Statistical Yearbook, 1999. 
 
    NHI is financed through mandatory contributions. The contribution rate (3.63%) applies to 
employees’ gross salary and is equally shared between the employer and the employee. 
 10Contributions for self-employed individuals are assessed through income, assets, standard of 
living and rate of participation in economic activities.  
    While health expenditure appears below its expected level, during the period 1985-1997 
Korea maintained the annual rate of growth of real per capita health expenditure above the 
annual rate of growth of real per capita GDP, with the exception of the first half of the 1990s. If 
the annual rate of growth of real per capita health expenditure is constantly above the annual 
rate of growth of real per capita GDP, then NHI contribution rates would need to continue to 
rise, other things equal, to maintain the NHI system in balance. This is because increases in 
contribution rates would be needed to compensate for a lower growth in incomes compared to 
the growth in outlays.  
    The financial position of the national health insurer has indeed been deteriorating over the 
years (Table 5). Rapid spending growth (18% per year between 1991 and 2000) exceeded 
increases in revenues (13% annually). Low contribution (and their inadequate rate of growth) is 
a first factor explaining the deterioration in the NHI financial position. Since 1995, the average 
annual increase for expenditures was much higher than for contributions. While still growing, 
contributions per capita could not keep the pace with rising benefits per capita, and the ratio 
between the two has been deteriorating over the years. There are various reasons that could 
explain low collection of contributions, for example, the stagnant economy during the Asian 
crisis, difficulties in collecting contributions and underreporting especially from the self-
employed. Clearly, keeping a policy of low contribution rates in a high-benefit growth context 
is unsustainable in the log run. 
    A second factor, which explains low revenues growth, is the decline in government 
subsidies to the self-insured pool. When self-employed people were included in the NHI system, 
the subsidy was meant to be 50% of the medical benefits of this category, but the ratio 
decreased over the years to about 25% in 1999. Overall government subsidies to the NHI 
accounted for 13% of total revenues in 1999. 
    Thirdly, and possibly more important, the NHI expenditure skyrocketed, showing a ten-fold 
increase in real terms over the period 1982-1999. This was due in large part to volume increases. 
Claims for medical benefits have grown more rapidly than population covered by the NHI 
scheme in the last decade. Over the period 1992-1999, the average covered population increased 
at an annual 1.1% while claims per capita increased at an annual 9.1%. In addition, the unit cost 
of a medical claim had an annual average growth of 7.4%, which can be seen as the result of 
increases in relative medical fees after 1995 and of more intensive care.  
 
 
 11Table 5. Financial Status of Health Insurers, 1994-1999 (billion won) 
    1996  1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 
1)
Revenues  2,704  2,884 3,038 3,123 3,346 5,326 
- of which  
contributions 
2,085  2,299 2,219 2,501 2,790 5,241 
Expenditures  2,555  3,112 3,425 3,699 4,137 7,184 
















Surplus  149  -227 -387 -576 -791  -1,858 
Revenues  944 938  905 1,217  1,274   
- of which  
contributions 
514 556  633 1,077  1,159   
Expenditures  892 1,081 1,201 1,182 1,314   

















Surplus 52  -  143  -297  36  -40   
Revenues  2,983  3,732 4,287 4,552 5,138 6,462 
- of which  
contributions 
2,232  2,784 3,256 3,712 4,481 6,082 
Expenditures  3,017  3,602 4,161 4,729 5,222 6,923 
















Surplus -34  129  126  -177  -85  -461 
Note: 1) The figures for ‘Industrial workers’ from the year 2001 include those for ‘Government employees 
and teachers’ 
Source: National Health Insurance Statistical Yearbook, 1999. 
 
 
3. Issues in Korean NHI 
    A financial crisis exploded in the NHI system since the end of 2000 as shown in Figure 3. 
The crisis has become the most urgent health issue on the national agenda for the Korean health 
care system. Deficits in health insurance skyrocketed in 2001, although they had appeared since 
the mid-1990s. At the end of 2001, the financial deficit had reached 2.7trillion won, or about a 
fifth of total NHI expenditures for the year. The government announced in May 2001 a 
comprehensive set of measures to improve the financial soundness of the NHI system, although 
loss of public confidence and the crisis-management situation seems to make it difficult to 











































Surplus/Deficit Surplus/Deficit (% of exp)
Source: National Health Insurance Corporation
 
Source: MOHW, NHIC, 2002. 
 
    Mass media and the NGOs have been heavily criticizing the government for the financial 
crisis, linking it to the July 2000 reform. The separation of doctors’ and pharmacists’ roles 
certainly accelerated the crisis, but other underlying pressures on fiscal stability pre-existed the 
July 2000 reforms.  
        As discussed before, the financial position of the national health insurer had been 
deteriorating before the July 2000 reform because of very rapid spending growth and inadequate 
increase in revenues. The NHI system would have continued to develop losses even if the 
reforms had never been implemented because of structural determinants of fiscal unbalances 
that arise, in part, from certain features of the health care system. The crisis exacerbated the 
need to address some among these features, for example low contributions and inflationary 
incentives underpinning the payment system. 
    It is nonetheless true that the separation reform contributed to the overall deficit, albeit it is 
difficult to estimate accurately the extent. Assuming NHI revenues had also grown in 2000 and 
2001 along the same trend as during the 1990s, the fiscal deficit of the NHI might have been a 
third of the 2001 level.  
 13    As to the integration reform, the overall impact on the level of surplus/deficit of the NHI 
system is not clear so far. However, OECD’s assessment of the integration reform was neutral. 
Integration smoothed the variability in fiscal status that existed across insurance societies 
differing for risk structure and contributory capacity. However, contrary to concerns emerged 
prior to the integration, it had no pejorative effect on the NHIC ability to collect revenues. In 
addition, it did not add to expenditures. On the contrary, early evidence suggests a decrease in 
administrative costs, and it also created a potential for more prudent purchasing of health 
services.  
    There is a certain government responsibility for the pace at which the fiscal status of the 
NHI worsened after, in particular, the separation reform. First, a couple of raising fees might 
have overcompensated doctors for the loss of margin from the sale of drugs covered by the NHI. 
Second, the extent of the expenditure increase was perhaps underestimated so that no measure 
was taken in advance to control its impact. This exacerbated the already unstable fiscal position 
of the NHI system. The decision to increase the contribution rates, a necessary measure to 
improve the fiscal status of the NHI but clearly an unpopular one, was delayed to the moment 
when the financial crisis erupted in 2001. In April 2002 the contribution rate was increased by 
6.7% and medical fee was decreased by 2.9% in March 2002. 
    The Korean society is looking forward to develop complementary financing schemes, such 
as Medical Savings Account (MSA), private insurance programs, global budgeting system and 
so on. The financial consolidation of the NHI has been discussed. Currently presidential 
candidates have their own opinions of these issues. We will see that Korean voter’s preferences 
among the issues in the near future. 
 
 
III. Projection of National Health Expenditures in Korea 
1. National Health Expenditures in Korea 
    Korea has a relatively low, but rapidly growing, level of health expenditure compared to 
other OECD countries. Public sources of health expenditure account for less than half of total 
funding while private funding is almost entirely represented by out-of-pocket payments. Drugs 
expenditures are high but the way expenditures were reported until July 2000 did not enable 
accurate monitoring of their share of expenditure. The share of expenditure represented by in-
patient care is relatively low by OECD standards but is growing. 
    Korea spends 5.1% of its GDP on health care, the third lowest share among OECD countries 
after Turkey and Mexico and well below the unweighted OECD average of 7.9%, as shown in 
 14Table 6. Per capita health expenditure (US$ 868 PPPs in 1999) was about half the OECD 
average of US$ 1,774 PPPs. 
 
Table 6. Health Expenditures as a Percent of GDP, 1970-1998 
Year  1970 1980 1990 1998
Australia 5.7 7 7.9 8.6
Austria 5.3 7.6 7.1 8
Belgium 4 6.4 7.4 8.6
Canada 7 7.1 9 9.3
Czech Republic 3.8 5 7.1
Denmark 8 9.1 8.5 8.3
Finland 5.6 6.4 7.9 6.9
France 5.7 7.4 8.6 9.4
Germany 6.3 8.8 8.7 10.3
Greece 5.6 6.5 7.5 8.4
Hungary 6.8
Iceland 4.9 6.1 7.9 8.4
Ireland 5.1 8.4 6.7 6.8
Italy 5.1 7 8.1 8.2
Japan 4.6 6.5 6.1 7.4
Korea 4.8 5.1
Luxembourg 3.5 5.9 6.1 6
Mexico 4.4 5.3
Netherlands 7.2 8 8.5 8.7
New Zealand 5.2 6 7 8.1
Norway 4.4 7 7.8
Poland 5.3 6.4
Portugal 2.7 5.6 6.2 7.7
Slovakia
Spain 3.6 5.4 6.6 7
Sweden 6.9 9.1 8.5 7.9
Switzerland 5.4 7.3 8.3 10.4
Turkey 2.4 3.3 3.6 4.8
United Kingdom 4.5 5.6 6 6.8
United States 6.9 8.7 11.9 12.9
G-7 average 5.7 7.3 8.3 9.2
20 country average 5.3 6.9 7.6 8.2
27-country average  7.2 7.9
Source : Health Data 2001
All member countries except Hungary, Norway and Slovakia.
ote that 1970 data for Australia and Denmark refer to 1971,
for the Netherlands refers to 1972
0-country average includes only those 20 countries with a relatively 
complete set of data for the years 1970-1998 and have not reported any 
major breaks in their series.  There are suggestions of breaks in the 






 1970 data  and 1970 data  * N 1) 
** 2 2) 
and Portugal
***  3) 
Source: OECD, Health Data, 2001. 
 15    Figure 4 shows that for almost the entire period 1987-1999, the increase in real per capita 
health expenditure has been rapid and higher than increases in real GDP per capita. This 
represents a considerable health expenditure increase considering that Korea featured the 
highest average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita in OECD countries in the period 
1970-1999. The pace of health expenditure growth has however varied over the years. A rapid 
rise in per capita health expenditure in the second half of the 1980s resulted from the 
progressive establishment of national health insurance and explains the increase in the share in 
this period. Upon attainment of universal coverage and the introduction of measures to stabilize 
expenditure growth, such as per-visit co-payments and the strict regulation of providers’ 
reimbursement fees, health expenditure growth slowed down. This brought about a decrease in 
the GDP share of total health expenditure in GDP between 1989 and 1991, followed by relative 
stability between 1992 and 1995. During the second half of the 1990s, signs of economic 
slowdown were observed in the Korean system, while health expenditure rose as a result of the 
widening of NHI benefits, growing population expectations, and the lack of effective cost 
control mechanisms. The increase in the GDP share in this period is an effect of these combined 
phenomena. Overall, while it was a slowdown in health expenditure growth that brought about 
the decrease of the GDP share in the first half of 1990s, it was largely a fall in the GDP growth 
which brought about the increase in the GDP share in the second half of the 1990s. 
 
 




































































































































Health expenditure per capita GDP per capita Share of total health expenditure in GDP
Real growth rate
Source: OECD Health Data 2001
 
Source: OECD, Health Data, 2001. Reprinted from OECD (2002) 
 
 
    The Korean public share of health care funding is low by the standards of other OECD 
countries. Although it rose from 36.6% in 1990 to 46.2% in 1998, it remains the second lowest 
share after the USA, and well below the OECD average of 75.2% (Table 7). The high private 
financing share is linked to substantial out-of-pocket payments, contrary to the US case where 
private financing derives from widespread private health insurance arrangements. Patients have 
to pay high co-payments towards their treatment charges, moreover they pay the full cost of 
services not included in the National Health Insurance benefit range. 
    Korea belongs to the group of OECD countries with a low public expenditure share that is 
moving towards a higher share. The public funding share has been increasing since 1985 
because public expenditure on health has generally increased faster than private expenditure. In 
particular, the increase has been brought about by the expansion of social health insurance. 
Public health expenditure expanded rapidly with widening population coverage during the 
1980s, particularly between 1987 and 1989. Between 1990 and 1997, the increase in the public 
funding share reflects the progressive extension of social health insurance benefits and the 
increase in the government subsidy to the health insurance scheme for the self-employed. 
 17During the 1997-1998 financial crisis, the public share increased as the result of a higher 
utilization of insured services and reduced investment by private medical institutions.  
Table 7. Public Funding in Total Health Expenditures, 1970-1998 
Public share in health expenditure (%) Average annual growth rate
1970* 1980 1990 1998 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-1998 1970-1998
Australia 62.8 62.8 67.4 70.0 0.0% 0.7% 0.5% 0.4%
Austria 63.0 68.8 73.5 71.8 0.9% 0.7% -0.3% 0.5%
Belgium 71.2
Canada 69.9 75.6 74.6 70.1 0.8% -0.1% -0.8% 0.0%
Czech Republic 96.6 96.8 96.2 91.9 0.0% -0.1% -0.6% -0.2%
Denmark 83.7 87.8 82.7 81.9 0.5% -0.6% -0.1% -0.1%
Finland 73.8 79.0 80.9 76.3 0.7% 0.2% -0.7% 0.1%
France 74.7 78.8 78.2 77.7 0.5% -0.1% -0.1% 0.1%
Germany 72.8 78.7 76.2 75.8 0.8% -0.3% -0.1% 0.1%
Greece 42.6 55.6 62.7 56.3 2.7% 1.2% -1.3% 1.0%
Hungary 76.5
Iceland 81.7 88.2 86.6 83.9 0.8% -0.2% -0.4% 0.1%
Ireland 81.7 81.6 71.7 76.8 0.0% -1.3% 0.9% -0.2%
Italy 86.9 80.5 78.1 67.3 -0.8% -0.3% -1.8% -0.9%
Japan 69.8 71.3 77.6 78.5 0.2% 0.9% 0.1% 0.4%
Korea 36.6 46.2 3.0%
Luxembourg 88.9 92.8 93.1 92.4 0.4% 0.0% -0.1% 0.1%
Mexico 40.8 48.0 2.1%
Netherlands 61.0 69.2 67.7 68.6 1.6% -0.2% 0.2% 0.4%
New Zealand 80.3 88.0 82.4 77.0 0.9% -0.7% -0.8% -0.1%
Norway** 91.6 85.1 82.8 -0.7% -0.3% -0.4%
Poland 91.7 65.4 -4.1%
Portugal 59.0 64.3 65.5 66.9 0.9% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%
Slovakia
Spain 65.4 79.9 78.7 76.4 2.0% -0.2% -0.4% 0.6%
Sweden 86.0 92.5 89.9 83.8 0.7% -0.3% -0.9% -0.1%
Turkey 37.3 27.3 61.0 71.9 -3.1% 8.4% 2.1% 2.4%
United Kingdom 87.0 89.4 84.3 83.3 0.3% -0.6% -0.1% -0.2%
United States 36.3 41.5 39.6 44.8 1.3% -0.5% 1.6% 0.8%
21-country average** 71.8 75.4 75.8 75.2 0.5% 0.1% -0.1% 0.2%  
Note: 1) OECD average is for those 21 countries that have a relatively complete data set. 
Source: OECD, Health Data, 2001 
 
    Korea has the second lowest inpatient share of total health expenditure and the highest drug 
share (almost double the OECD average) among OECD countries for which data are available 
(Table 8). The inpatient share has been gradually increasing over the last decades. In part this 
could be explained by a rapid rise in hospital beds and the average length of stay. The high drug 
share can be seen, in part, as the result of two factors. First, Koreans seem to have a strong 
propensity to consume pharmaceuticals. Second, doctors shifted the mix of treatment inputs 
from their own services towards drugs to compensate for limited consultation time (due to a low 
doctor to population ratio) and low NHI fees.  
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 Inpatient  Outpatient  plus  drugs 
   Outpatient  Drugs  Sub-total 
Greece 24.8  n.a.  14.7  n.a. 
Korea1) 28.9  28.0  30.0  58.0 
Turkey 29.3  64.1  n.a.  n.a. 
Luxembourg 29.8  49.9  11.7  61.6 
Germany 34.0  28.9  12.7  41.6 
Belgium 34.6  34.0  16.1  50.1 
Czech Republic  35.1  27.4  27.0  54.4 
Norway 36.1  20.9  9.1  30.0 
Portugal 36.2  n.a.  25.8  n.a. 
Japan 37.6  32.8  16.8  49.6 
United States  40.5  32.7  11.0  43.7 
Finland 40.7  30.6  15.1  45.7 
Canada 42.3  26.1  15.4  41.5 
Australia 43.3  22.0  11.4  33.4 
France 43.8  22.8  22.8  45.6 
Italy 44.5  27.7  17.5  45.2 
Spain 44.8  n.a.  20.7  n.a. 
Switzerland 50.3  40.1  7.6  47.7 
Netherlands 52.7  20.4  11.0  31.4 
Hungary 53.1  n.a.  26.5  n.a. 
Denmark 53.9  25.0  9.0  34.0 
Iceland 55.7  22.3  15.4  37.7 
New Zealand  59.1  n.a.  14.4  n.a. 
23-country average2)  41.4  30.9  16.4  47.5 
Notes: 1) For Korea, data are estimates from: Commission on Health Care Reform(1998). Health Care 
Reform (in Korean). In OECD Health Data, Korean figures do not enable to appreciate the 
relative share of outpatient and drug expenditure, because drugs dispensed by doctors were 
classified under the outpatient share until the July 2000 Separation Reform.  
      2)  All 23 countries in the table. 
Source: OECD, Health Data, 2001.  
 
 
2. Projection of Health Expenditures 
    It is difficult to identify the ‘right’ level of expenditure on health compared with expenditure 
on other goods and services. There are nonetheless three sets of considerations that can inform 
judgements about macroeconomic efficiency. First, how health expenditure compares with the 
level for a country at the same stage of economic development. Second, whether health 
expenditure growth, particularly public expenditure, is maintained along a fiscally sustainable 
rate. Third, how well the health system seems to respond to societal preferences for the 
allocation of resources between health and non-health goods and services, considering both the 
level and trend of health expenditures. 
Per capita health expenditure in Korea is below the level expected for a country with her level 
of income, as shown in Figure 5. The expected level is calculated along a regression line fitted 
 19to observations of per capita health expenditure and per capita income for OECD countries.
2 
Figure 5 shows the distance existing between per capita health expenditure (868 US$ PPPs) and 
expected per capita health expenditure (1,249 US$ PPPs). 
 
Figure 5. Per capita Health Expenditure and per capita Income, 1999 













0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000

























Source: OECD Health Data 2001
KOREA
 
Source: OECD, Health Data, 2001. Reprinted from OECD(2002) 
 
    There are various explanations for why actual the level of health expenditures in Korea 
appears below the expected level.  
    First, historically the government set low priority to health over other sectors of the 
economy and invested little in medical facilities and services. The establishment of universal 
social health insurance, which led to a drastic increase in health expenditure, is a relatively 
recent achievement. Meanwhile, some high cost, high-technology services, whose diffusion and 
utilisation are linked to government propensity to include them in the social insurance benefit 
package, are predominantly uninsured. This might have deterred consumers from purchasing 
health care, particularly costly services. It might also have initially slowed down investment in 
private western medicine facilities, although only for a limited period of time as Korean 
hospitals have a relatively high (and unconstrained) propensity to diffuse new medical 
technology. 
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2.  OECD(2002)     Secondly, contrary to the other OECD countries, Korea has a high level of private out-of-
pocket payments. When other OECD countries had the same per capita level of GDP as Korea 
today they spent relatively more on health but they also had a significantly lower share of out-
of-pocket expenditure and more comprehensives public systems. Although this does not imply 
per se the existence of an inverse relationship between health expenditure per capita and the 
proportion of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments in total health financing, it might be in line with 
evidence that more generous insurance leads to more consumption. It might be probable that the 
poor benefit coverage and high co-payments of the Korean NHI are dampening demand for 
unnecessary, and possibly also necessary, health care services.  
Table 9. Per capita Health Expenditure and OOP Share, various OECD countries 
  GDP per capita 
 (US PPPs) 
THE per capita 
(US PPPs) 
Share of out-of-pocket  
Expenditure in THE 
Korea (1999)  16,059  868  43.8 
US (1984)  16,523  1,617  22.7 
France (1989)  16,611  1,420  11.7 
Germany (1988)  15,865  1,487  11.1 
Japan (1989)  16,294  1,012  23.4 
UK (1990)  16,105  968  10.6 
Canada (1987)  15,869  1,338  14.7 
 Source: OECD, Health data, 2001. 
    Thirdly, the Korean government used fee control as a tool to contain expenditure growth 
within the NHI. This policy has been rather successful on a couple of aspects. All medical 
providers are under compulsory contract with the NHI system and the government fee schedule 
applies to all of them. The MOHW also managed to enforce a fee schedule below market prices 
when the NHI was first established.  
    In conclusion, it is unlikely to increase in health expenditures in the near future in Koea. 
 
 
3. Intergenerational Burden of Health Expenditures 
    The health expenditures for the elderly in NHI (HEEN) have been increased dramatically. 
The share of the HEEN in the total health expenditures (THE) increased from 4.7% in 1985 to 
15.4% in 1998. The growth rates of the THE and HEEN are almost 17 and 54, respectively, 
during the same period (Table 10). 
    The growth rate of the HEEN to the THE, comparing with the growth rate of the elderly 
share, increased by 2 times during the same period. Since this phenomenon seems to be 
continued, the burden of younger generation will be heavy. 
 
 21Table 10. The Health Expenditures for the Elderly in NHI (million won) 
Year  Health expenditures 
(A) 
Health expenditures 

















Source: MOHW, 2000. 
 
 
IV. Regulations in the Korean Health Market 
1. Demand Regulations 
    As we discussed before, patients enjoy freedom of choice of provider within the system., 
and  also receive medical treatment without long delays even though all medical services are 
not allowed to be covered by the NHI. Relatively they have less regulation on utilizing medical 
services. However, review system towards utilization of medical services is tightening and 
patients’ burden of financing in NHI seems to increase as financial imbalance is bigger. 
    As to insured drugs, Korea relies on demand side cost control measures, such as co-
payments and listing of drugs eligible for public reimbursement, to limit patients’ consumption 
of drugs.  The choice of the co-payment level and the generosity of the list have an impact on 
overall drug expenditures. Reference pricing has been proposed as a part of the government 
measures to stabilize NHI finances. With reference pricing, public reimbursement is set at the 
level of an alternative lower-priced drug, making patients liable to pay the difference between 
the reference price and the higher costs of other drugs. However, reference pricing is unlikely to 
be implemented because of strong resistance from pharmaceutical manufacturers, providers and 
consumers. 
 
2. Supply Regulations 
    All medical facilities in Korea are automatically eligible and obliged to provide medical 
services under the NHI scheme. Since 1979, the National Federation of Medical Insurers (the 
equivalent of the current NHIC) has been empowered to designate medical institutions 
participating in the social health insurance system. All providers are part of the scheme and 
cannot refuse such designation.  
   Apart from health centres, there is no plan for the geographical distribution of medical 
facilities, which are therefore left to private initiative. The only requirement governing the 
opening of hospitals is that they should have minimal number of beds and departments. Above 
 22such minimal requirements, the number of hospital beds is entirely decided by the medical 
institutions themselves. The purchasing and diffusion of medical technology is also unplanned. 
Planning of human resources is indirect. The MOHW consults with the Ministry of Education 
and Human Resource Development over the number of students entering medical schools. 
However, control over numbers is not firm because medical schools are private. The number of 
medical schools more than doubled from 19 in 1980 to 41 in 2000.  
 
3. Price and Quality Regulations 
    Regulation of NHI focuses especially on the medical fee schedule. While fees for the next 
year are now supposed to be negotiated between providers and the NHIC until November 15 
each year, the government had maintained unilateral control over setting and revising fees until 
recently. If negotiation fails, the Health Insurance Policy Deliberation Committee (HIPDC) 
decides medical fees. This committee was established in 2002 and presides over decisions on 
changes in benefit coverage, contribution rates, drug prices and medical fees. The members of 
HIPDC are the government officials, the medical profession, scholars, the NGOs, and labour 
union. 
    Recently control over insured drug prices is tightening. For example, price of all insured 
drugs should be revised after registration for three years. 
    There has been a limited effort at controlling the quality of clinical care. All medical 
facilities that registered or reported their establishment according to the Medical Service Act or 
the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act do not need to meet any specific quality standard. Hospitals 
need to receive ‘accreditation’ before commencing to practice. However, ‘accreditation’ only 
regulates minimum staffing and speciality requirement. The MOHW has attempted to launch a 
nation-wide Hospital Service Evaluation Program but this is not fully established yet. The 
hospital standardization review, which is run by the Korean Hospital Association, is only meant 
to guide the allocation of resident doctors into hospitals, and does not entail disciplinary 
procedures or peer review to enhance quality of medical care.  
 
 
V. Towards the Reforms in Health Policy 
1. Deregulations in Health Market 
 
    The sale of the over the-counter (OTC) drugs should be expanded in the near future. It is 
difficult for the consumers to purchase OTC drugs during the night time and on weekends. 
    Pharmacists are able to promote the consumption of cheaper, but equally effective, drugs for 
 23branded one. The substitution right should be expanded for counterbalance to doctor’s tendency 
to prescribe branded products more intensively. 
    The Korean Medical Association (KMA) had sued the NHIC (or government) for the 
empowerment of designation of providers to participate in the NHI system, as discussed before. 
Currently the Constitutional Court of Korea decided to confirm the empowerment of 
designation, so that this dispute is unlikely to be happened again. 
 
2. Reform in the National Health Insurance 
    From a mid- to long-term perspective, the structure of medical security system should be 
geared towards increasing security against medical risks and ensuring financial stability. To 
achieve such an aim would require reforming the current medical security system into a multi-
pillar medical security system with which to ensure a balance between social and individual 
responsibilities and between competition and control mechanisms (Figure 6). The model shown 
in Figure 6 was suggested by Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs. 
 











Total life cycle health management program 
1)
Minor risks (small fees) 
Medium risks (short-term hospitalization and 
high-cost outpatient services)







Note: 1) aims at curbing national medical expenditures by providing guidelines and 
management programs regarding vaccination, nutrition, exercise, sexual life, stress, 
smoking, drinking, drug, environmental hormone, blood sugar, and cholesterol. 
 
  1st pillar: secures payments of small fees though family medical savings accounts.  
  2nd pillar: secures payments of fees for short-term hospitalization and high-cost outpatient 
services through social insurance premiums.   
  3rd pillar: secures the financial means for major risk insurance, which requires high payments, 





Policy Options    Aims 
    
- Extension of coverage -> insurance against high-cost medical 
services   
- Preventive healthcare and health promotion services -> 
prevention of diseases 
  Enhancement the security against 
medical risks 
    
- Introduction of medical savings account   
  -> reduction of moral hazard associated with healthcare 
service utilization (reduction of costs)  
- Introduction of total expenditure target system 
  -> decisions regarding total reimbursement, insurance 
benefits, premium contributions, and government support 
should be made withing the scope of total expenditure 
target 
- Institutionalization of health promotion and disease 
prevention systems → effective in long-term reduction of 
national medical expenditures 
 
Enhancement of the efficiency of 
medical resource utilization 
(Financial stabilization) 
    
- Insurance against high cost medical services -> protection 
from family bankruptcy 
- Family medical savings -> linkage of benefits to individual 
burden 
  Balance between medical 





    The public insurance should adjust its benefit system with a view to covering major risks 
while at the same time guaranteeing disease prevention benefits. As to minor risks, there must 
be competition between the public insurance and private insurance as complementary insurance 
in attracting patients while maintaining their complementary relationship. Consumers should be 
given an option of choosing between public and private health insurance plans. A public 
insurance enrollee will be required to pay, in addition to the basic premium contribution, an 
extra premium contribution to have a wide benefit package that covers major risks. 
    Providers’ incentives for making efficient use of resources, which are embedded in payment 
mechanisms, should be strengthened. Fee-for-service reimbursement of providers, as in the case 
of Korea, rewards provision of unnecessary treatments and higher use of more expensive 
specialist care to treat simple cases. It also provides no compensation for efforts to reduce 
unjustified variations in treatment across providers. The Korea government has made certain 
steps towards the introduction of mixed payment mechanisms. The Resource-Based Relative 
Value Scale (RBRVS) and Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) were already introduced. The 
volume-related providers’ reimbursement is working by progressively reducing the unit fee at 
which incremental treatments are reimbursed so that the providers have less incentives to 
increase volumes. The results of these changes should be evaluated attentively, and the 
 25mechanisms strengthened accordingly. Other payment systems can also be considered. 
    Financing equity in the National Health Insurance system can also be improved by setting 
annual income-related caps on individuals’ co-payments. This alternative would have a higher 
cost and greater administrative complexity, but is preferable when one considers the current 
financial barriers to access to health care.  
    The government should adopt an explicit policy to increase public health expenditures, 
setting implicit or explicit aggregate spending targets for the next 2 to 3 years. Expenditure 
plans should be linked to forecasts of revenues, based on estimates of an acceptable contributory 
burden for the taxpayer and on other revenues such as government subsidies. Mechanisms will 
then be needed to maintain expenditure within the plan.  
    Expenditure planning and spending targets have been adopted by various OECD countries. 
Their experiences suggest that such budgets have had success in controlling health expenditures, 
for example containing hospital expenditures in France and helping to slow down expenditure 
growth in Germany.  
    Better clinical regulation is needed. There is scope for supporting self-regulation. There is 
also for turning the Hospital Service Evaluation Program run by the MOHW into an effective 
mechanism for monitoring hospital services and assessing technology. Having modernized its 
information systems, the NHIC could systematically collect and analyze performance measures 
of medical institutions. The results of such an evaluation program could help to create an 
evidence base for setting performance targets and could be opened to public scrutiny. Protocols 
of clinical practice and quality assurance programmes would also need to be developed. This 
requires reinforced collaboration among the NHIC, medical professions, and the MOHW.  
    Improvements in quality of care could be stimulated by effective self-regulation. Incentives 
are needed to encourage the development and adoption of evidence-based best practices by the 
medical profession. Recent OECD work highlights indeed how self-regulation can benefit from 
financial support
3. Clinical guidelines are needed to help to smooth variations in treatments 





3. Efficient Use of Information Technology 
  Currently information technology of Korea has been developed rapidly. The diffusion of 
information technologies will be helpful for both patients and providers in terms of cost 
                                                           
3.  Or. Z. (2002). 
 26containment and quality of care. For example, the NHIC could systematically collect and 
analyze performance measures of medical institutions. The government and the NHIC are 
giving incentives to providers, especially to the hospitals, to increase in the volume of insurance 
claims with EDI process. It is expected that review process of claims will be shortened and 
production of new statistics for the evidence-based policy making will be easier. A system of 
electronic patient cards is unlikely to be introduced in the near future. 
 
4. Restructuring the Elderly Health Care System 
    As the demand for long-term care (LTC) for the elderly is likely to increase sharply with the 
rapid process of aging, public LTC insurance could help to finance elderly nursing services. The 
insurance mechanism would go well with the catastrophic nature of this type of risk. LTC 
insurance would relieve the NHI finances of the cost of social hospitalisation. It would also 
improve elderly access to home care, special hospitals and nursing homes, particularly if 
informal family ties break down further. However, LTC insurance would have a cost, as 
premiums need to be paid in addition to NHI contributions. Also, effort should be made to 
establish Elderly LTC Insurance by expanding the target population and the benefit 
level/package over time. The fund necessary for the protection of severely ill elderly patients 
may be financed from the general tax revenue.  
    Also the number of long-term care facilities for the elderly should be increased. Projections 
suggested by Korea Institute for health and Social Affairs indicate that the number of elderly 
receiving long-term care will increase by 73% between 2000 and 2010
4. As the informal family 
network, which used to provide strong social and health care support to the elderly, is 
weakening, there might be a growing need for public forms of care. Although there are plans to 
expand the availability of long term care services, there is a risk that the elderly in need of 
nursery care might be hospitalised. Currently, no distinction exists between chronic beds and 
acute care beds in hospitals. Social hospitalisation should be avoided. It would create an undue 
burden on the already strained NHI system in terms of longer stays and higher cost of treatment 
in hospitals, compared to nursing care in specialised institutions such as residential homes or at 
home. But to avoid it, adequate and affordable care services need to be available, irrespective of 
how the cost of long-term care will be financed. 
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